Entry Submitted by Vee at 2:23 PM EDT on April 14, 2020
Trump chides Cuomo for seeking 'independence' in coronavirus response
https://www.yahoo.com/news/coronavirus-trump-cuomo-king-independence-total-authority-155243284.html
Ok here we go .. I've seen it on the news .. actually Cuomo's daily press on the corona news.
I wish I was there to asks a few questions.. the first one would be.. so you say your not under the Federal mandate of PUTUS ? Can you please tell me that if you ie. the State Of New York government is not then explain why there are gold fringes on the 2 flags hanging be hanging you.
Explain if the Constitution says Art. 10 sec 1 "that no State shall ... make anything but gold and silver for payment so debt ... " Are you .. Why aren't you ?
And last .. the Supreme Court renders the law of the land, what is what and to whom it applies.
Chisholm v. Georgia :: 2 U.S. 419 (1793)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/419/#tab-opinion-1921609 ( go to case
Wilson, Justice.
1. I am, first, to examine this question by the principles of general jurisprudence. What I shall say upon this head I introduce by the observation of an original and profound writer who, in the philosophy of mind and all the sciences attendant on this prime one, has formed an era not less remarkable, and far more illustrious, than that formed by the justly celebrated Bacon in another science, not prosecuted with less ability, but less dignified as to its object; I mean the philosophy of matter. Dr. Reid, in his excellent enquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense, speaking of the sceptical and illiberal
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philosophy, which under bold but false pretentions to liberality, prevailed in many parts of Europe before he wrote, makes the following judicious remark:
"The language of philosophers with regard to the original faculties of the mind is so adapted to the prevailing system that it cannot fit any other; like a coat that fits the man for whom it was made, and shews him to advantage, which yet will fit very aukward upon one of a different make, although as handsome and well proportioned. It is hardly possible to make any innovation in our philosophy concerning the mind and its operations without using new words and phrases, or giving a different meaning to those that are received."
With equal propriety may this solid remark be applied to the great subject on the principles of which the decision of this Court is to be founded. The perverted use of genus and species in logic, and of impressions and ideas in metaphysics, have never done mischief so extensive or so practically pernicious as has been done by States and sovereigns in politics and jurisprudence -- in the politics and jurisprudence even of those who wished and meant to be free. In the place of those expressions, I intend not to substitute new ones; but the expressions themselves I shall certainly use for purposes different from those for which hitherto they have been frequently used; and one of them I shall apply to an object still more different from that to which it has hitherto been more frequently -- I may say almost universally -- applied. In these purposes, and in this application, I shall be justified by example the most splendid, and by authority the most binding; the example of the most refined as well as the most free nation known to antiquity; and the authority of one of the best Constitutions known to modern times. With regard to one of the terms, "state," this authority is declared; with regard to the other, "sovereign," the authority is implied only. But it is equally strong. For, in an instrument well drawn, as in a poem well composed, mence is sometimes most expressive.
To the Constitution of the United States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety. But even in that place, it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced themselves "SOVEREIGN" people of the United States. But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.
Having thus avowed my disapprobation of the purposes for which the terms, state and sovereign are frequently used, and of the object to which the application of the last of them is almost universally made, it is now proper that I should disclose the meaning which I assign to both, and the application,
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which I make of the latter. In doing this, I shall have occasion incidently to evince how true it is that states and governments were made for man, and, at the same time, how true it is that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and, at last, oppressed their master and maker.
Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance. When I speak of a state as an inferior contrivance, I mean that it is a contrivance inferior only to that which is divine. Of all human contrivances, it is certainly most transcendantly excellent. It is concerning this contrivance that
Cicero says so sublimely,
"Nothing, which is exhibited upon our globe is more acceptable to that divinity which governs the whole universe than those communities and assemblages of men which, lawfully associated, are denominated states. [Footnote 1]"
Let a state be considered as subordinate to the people. But let everything else be subordinate to the state. ...
This second degree of perversion is confined to the old world, and begins to diminish even there; but the first degree is still too prevalent, even in the several States of which our union is composed. By a "state," I mean a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit to enjoy peaceably what is their own and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; it has its rules; it has its rights; and it has its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts, and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this
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feigned and artificial person, we should never forget that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act are men.
Is the foregoing description of a state a true description? It will not be questioned but it is. Is there any part of this description, which intimates in the remotest manner that a state, any more than the men who compose it, ought not to do justice and fulfil engagements? It will not be pretended that there is. If justice is not done; if engagements are not fulfilled, is it, upon general principles of right, less proper in the case of a great number than in the case of an individual to secure by compulsion that which will not be voluntarily performed? Less proper it surely cannot be. The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws is that he binds himself. Upon the same principles upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the courts of justice which are formed and authorised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this, why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is undiminished, the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired. A state, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest state, like a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it. The latter is amenable to a court of justice. Upon general principles of right, shall the former, when summoned to answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, Proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice by declaring "I am a Sovereign state?" Surely not. Before a claim so contrary, in its first appearance to the general principles of right and equality be sustained by a just and impartial tribunal, the person, natural or artificial, entitled to make such claim should certainly be well known and authenticated. Who, or what, is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty? On this subject, the errors and the mazes are endless and inexplicable. To enumerate all therefore will not be expected. To take notice of some will be necessary to the full illustration of the present important cause.
In one sense, the term "sovereign" has for its correlative "subject." In this sense, the term can receive no application, for it has no object in the Constitution of the United states. Under that Constitution, there are citizens, but no subjects. "Citizen of the United states." [Footnote 2] "Citizens of another state." "Citizens of different states." "A state or citizen thereof." [Footnote 3] The term, subject,occurs, indeed, once in the instrument; but to mark the contrast strongly, the epithet "foreign" [Footnote 4] is prefixed. In this sense, I presume the state of Georgia has no claim upon
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her own citizens. In this sense, I am certain, she can have no claim upon the citizens of another state.
In another sense, according to some writers, [Footnote 5] every state, which governs itself without any dependence on another power is a sovereign state. Whether, with regard to her own citizens, this is the case of the state of Georgia; whether those citizens have done, as the individuals of England are said by their late instructors to have done, surrendered the supreme power to the state or government, and reserved nothing to themselves; or whether, like the people of other states, and of the United states, the citizens of Georgia have reserved the supreme power in their own hands, and on that supreme power have made the state dependent, instead of being sovereign -- these are questions to which, as a judge in this cause, I can neither know nor suggest the proper answers, though, as a citizen of the Union, I know, and am interested to know that the most satisfactory answers can be given. As a citizen, I know the government of that state to be republican; and my short definition of such a government is one constructed on this principle -- that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide upon the knowledge that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the "People of the United states," did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state, but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign state. If the judicial decision of this case forms one of those purposes, the allegation that Georgia is a sovereign state is unsupported by the fact. Whether the judicial decision of this cause is or is not one of those purposes is a question which will be examined particularly in a subsequent part of my argument. ...
In the United states, and in the several states, which compose the Union, we go not so far, but still we go one step farther than we ought to go in this unnatural and inverted order of things. The states, rather than the people, for whose sakes the states exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I believe, has produced much of the confusion and perplexity which have appeared in several proceedings and several publications on state politics, and on the politics, too, of the United states. Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate kind prevail in our common, even in our convivial, language. Is a toast asked? "The United states," instead of the "People of the United states," is the toast given. This is not politically correct. The toast is meant to present to view the first great object in the Union: it presents only the second. It presents only the artificial person, instead of the natural persons who spoke it into existence. A state I cheerfully fully
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admit, is the noblest work of Man. But, Man himself, free and honest, is, I speak as to this world, the noblest work of God. ...
When Homer, one of the most correct, as well as the oldest of human authorities, enumerates the other nations of Greece whose forces acted at the siege of Troy, he arranges them under the names of their different Kings or Princes. But when he comes to the Athenians, he distinguishes them by the peculiar appellation of the PEOPLE [Footnote 19] of Athens. The well known address used by Demosthenes, when he harrangued and animated his assembled countrymen, was "O Men of Athens." With the strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national scene opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could present. "The PEOPLE of the United states" are the first personages introduced. Who were those people? They were the citizens of thirteen states, each of which had a separate constitution and government, and all of which were connected together by Articles of Confederation. To the purposes of public strength and felicity, that Confederacy was totally inadequate. A requisition on the several states terminated its legislative authority. Executive or judicial authority it had none. In order therefore to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, to ensure domestic tranquillity, to provide for common defence, and to secure the blessings of liberty, those people, among whom were the people of Georgia, ordained and established the present Constitution. By that Constitution legislative power is vested, executive power is vested, judicial power is vested.
The next question under this head, is has the Constitution done so? Did those people mean to exercise this, their undoubted power? These questions may be resolved either by fair and conclusive deductions or by direct and explicit declarations. In order ultimately to discover whether the people of the United states intended to bind those states by the judicial power vested by the national Constitution, a previous enquiry will naturally be: did those people intend to bind those states by the legislative power vested by that Constitution? The Articles of Confederation, it is well known, did not operate upon individual citizens, but operated only upon states. This defect was remedied by the national Constitution, which, as all allow, has an operation on individual citizens. But if an opinion which some seem to entertain be just, the defect remedied on one side was balanced by a defect introduced on the other. For they seem to think that the present Constitution operates only on individual citizens, and not on states. This opinion, however, appears to be altogether unfounded. When certain laws of the states are declared to be "subject to the revision and controul of the Congress," [Footnote 20] it cannot, surely, be contended that the legislative power of the national government was meant to have no operation on the several states. The fact, uncontrovertibly established in one instance, proves the principle in all other instances to which the facts will be found to apply. We may then infer that the people of the United states intended to bind the several states by the legislative power of the national government.
In order to make the discovery at which we ultimately aim, a second previous enquiry will naturally be: did the people of the United states intend to bind the several states by the executive power of the national government? The affirmative answer to the former question directs, unavoidably, an affirmative answer to this. Ever since the time of Bracton, his maxim, I believe, has been deemed a good one: "supervacuum esset leges condere, nisi esset qui leges tueretur." [Footnote 21] "It would be superfluous to make laws unless those laws, when made, were to be enforced." When the laws are plain, and the application of them is uncontroverted, they are enforced immediately by the
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The question now opens fairly to our view, could the people of those states, among whom were those of Georgia, bind those states, and Georgia among the others, by the legislative, executive, and judicial power so vested? If the principles on which I have founded myself are just and true, this question must unavoidably receive an affirmative answer. If those states were the work of those people, those people, and that I may apply the case closely, the people of Georgia, in particular,
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could alter as they pleased their former work. To any given degree, they could diminish as well as enlarge it. Any or all of the former state powers, they could extinguish or transfer. The inference which necessarily results is that the Constitution ordained and established by those people, and, still closely to apply the case, in particular by the people of Georgia, could vest jurisdiction or judicial power over those states and over the State of Georgia in particular.
The next question under this head, is has the Constitution done so? Did those people mean to exercise this, their undoubted power? These questions may be resolved either by fair and conclusive deductions or by direct and explicit declarations. In order ultimately to discover whether the people of the United states intended to bind those states by the judicial power vested by the national Constitution, a previous enquiry will naturally be: did those people intend to bind those states by the legislative power vested by that Constitution? The Articles of Confederation, it is well known, did not operate upon individual citizens, but operated only upon states. This defect was remedied by the national Constitution, which, as all allow, has an operation on individual citizens. But if an opinion which some seem to entertain be just, the defect remedied on one side was balanced by a defect introduced on the other. For they seem to think that the present Constitution operates only on individual citizens, and not on states. This opinion, however, appears to be altogether unfounded. When certain laws of the states are declared to be "subject to the revision and controul of the Congress," [Footnote 20] it cannot, surely, be contended that the legislative power of the national government was meant to have no operation on the several states. The fact, uncontrovertibly established in one instance, proves the principle in all other instances to which the facts will be found to apply. We may then infer that the people of the United states intended to bind the several states by the legislative power of the national government.
In order to make the discovery at which we ultimately aim, a second previous enquiry will naturally be: did the people of the United states intend to bind the several states by the executive power of the national government? The affirmative answer to the former question directs, unavoidably, an affirmative answer to this. Ever since the time of Bracton, his maxim, I believe, has been deemed a good one: "supervacuum esset leges condere, nisi esset qui leges tueretur." [Footnote 21] "It would be superfluous to make laws unless those laws, when made, were to be enforced." When the laws are plain, and the application of them is uncontroverted, they are enforced immediately by the
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executive authority of government. When the application of them is doubtful or intricate, the interposition of the judicial authority becomes necessary. The same principle therefore which directed us from the first to the second step will direct us from the second to the third and last step of our deduction. Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of the United states did vest this court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia. The same truth may be deduced from the declared objects and the general texture of the Constitution of the United states. One of its declared objects is to form an Union more perfect than, before that time, had been formed. Before that time, the Union possessed legislative, but uninforced legislative power over the states. Nothing could be more natural than to intend that this legislative power should be enforced by powers executive and judicial. Another declared object is, "to establish justice." This points, in a particular manner, to the judicial authority. And when we view this object in conjunction with the declaration, "that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts," we shall probably think that this object points, in a particular manner, to the jurisdiction of the court over the several states. What good purpose could this constitutional provision secure if a state might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts, and be amenable, for such a violation of right to no controuling judiciary power? We have seen that on the principles of general jurisprudence, a state, for the breach of a contract, may be liable for damages. A third declared object is "to ensure domestic tranquillity." This tranquillity is most likely to be disturbed by controversies between states. These consequences will be most peaceably and effectually decided by the establishment and by the exercise of a superintending judicial authority. By such exercise and establishment, the law of nations, the rule between contending states, will be enforced among the several states in the same manner as municipal law.
Whoever considers, in a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture of the Constitution will be satisfied that the people of the United states intended to form themselves into a nation for national purposes. They instituted for such purposes a national government, complete in all its parts, with powers legislative, executive and judicial, and in all those powers extending over the whole nation. Is it congruous that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men, any person natural or artificial, should be permitted to claim successfully an entire exemption from the jurisdiction of the national government? Would not such claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very existence as a nation? When
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so many trains of deduction, coming from different quarters, converge and unite at last in the same point, we may safely conclude, as the legitimate result of this Constitution, that the State of Georgia is amenable to the jurisdiction of this court.
But, in my opinion, this doctrine rests not upon the legitimate result of fair and conclusive deduction from the Constitution. It is confirmed beyond all doubt by the direct and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself. "The judicial power of the United states shall extend, to controversies between two states." [Footnote 22] Two states are supposed to have a controversy between them. This controversy is supposed to be brought before those vested with the judicial power of the United states. Can the most consummate degree of professional ingenuity devise a mode by which this "controversy between two states" can be brought before a court of law, and yet neither of those states be a defendant? "The judicial power of the United states shall extend to controversies between a state and citizens of another state." Could the strictest legal language, could even that language which is peculiarly appropriated to an art deemed by a great master to be one of the most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law; could this strict and appropriated language describe with more precise accuracy the cause now depending before the tribunal? Causes, and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice in her equal scales. On the former solely her attention is fixed. To the latter she is, as she is painted, blind.
I have now tried this question by all the touchstones to which I proposed to apply it. I have examined it by the principles of general jurisprudence; by the laws and practice of states and Kingdoms; and by the Constitution of the United states. From all, the combined inference is that the action lies.
Cuomo .. the Federal government of the United States of America .. and POTUS being the head of it has the power to mandate a State.
Vee
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